Historical report: The original article was published on December 16, 2025, at 15:00 (UTC+8). The proposals and positions below reflect the discussion as reported then, not a current governance status.
A proposal to end ENS DAO’s three working groups became a debate about who can participate in an open organization—and whether its contributors can challenge one another without risking future support.
On November 14, 2025, ENS DAO secretary Limes proposed a temperature check on ending the metagovernance, ecosystem and public-goods working groups when their sixth term ended on December 31. Limes, who had spent four years as a steward and two as secretary, argued that dependence on relationships for future funding discouraged candid criticism. He also argued that working groups could not adequately select contributors or remove ineffective ones. Those were his diagnoses, not established findings about every participant.
ENS founder Nick Johnson wrote on November 18 that political struggles in the working groups had driven away dedicated contributors and that more would leave at the term’s end. He favored pausing, rather than abolishing, the groups while finding a sustainable replacement. He suggested that a management company could handle day-to-day operations and expressed concern about the DAO’s ability to meet legal obligations without professional contributors.
Other participants described different risks. Contributor ENSPunks.eth alleged gatekeeping, conflicts of interest and the loss of skilled contributors; they also alleged that contributors had been discouraged from asking questions. Those claims were contested perspectives in the governance discussion, not independently verified conclusions in the source article. Participant jkm.eth, meanwhile, said ENS DAO’s unusual openness had helped them enter the ecosystem—an experience that complicates the case for tighter participation rules.
Contributor clowes.eth said the public-goods group had funded worthwhile projects, while metagovernance handled administrative work and the ecosystem group offered a place to present work. Their concern was that few newcomers joined working-group discussions; they noted that participation had not been measured. Clowes.eth also criticized what they saw as limited DAO visibility into ENS Labs’ plans, despite the DAO’s reported annual funding of $9.7 million to Labs for ENSv2–Namechain. They proposed an operating company with accountable leadership as one possible structural response.
The proposed remedies differed. James called for an independent review of two years of DAO spending, with a proposed Metagov-led budget of $100,000–$150,000. Johnson questioned the cost; James argued it was proportionate to a DAO spending more than $10 million annually. Limes and supporters preferred acting without that review. Participant vegayp separately suggested restricting stewards’ and service providers’ voting while in office to address potential conflicts.
As of the December 16 report, the original proposal had been rejected, further proposals remained under discussion, and the outcome was uncertain. The dispute illustrates a governance choice rather than a settled verdict: openness can let people in, but participants disagreed sharply over how to pair it with scrutiny, continuity and accountability.

